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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 20010140-SC

Plaintiff/Appellee,

vs.
KEVIN K. BOWERS,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for possession of a controlled substance within
a drug-free zone with a prior conviction, afirstdegree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8 (Supp. 1999), and possession of drug paraphernalia within a drug-free zone, a class
A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998). Because defendant filed
his notice of appeal more than 30 days after sentencing, this Court does not have jurisdiction
{see point I below). However, should the Court find that the appeal was timely, it has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 2001).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Does this Court have jurisdiction to consider defendant's appeal where his notice

of appeal was filed more than 30 days after entry of judgment and sentence?

1

Standard of Review. No standard of review applies. However, whether appellate
jurisdiction exists is a question of law. Pledgerv. Gillespie, 1999 UT54,^[ 16,982 P.2d 572.
2.

Was the evidence sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for possession of

a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia?
Standard of Review. This Court affords great deference to the jury verdict and will
not reverse a conviction unless "the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that reasonable
[minds] could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." State v.
Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980). However, if a defendant fails to marshal the
evidence in support of the jury verdict, the Court assumes the evidence supported the verdict.
See Water & Energy Systems Tech., Inc. v. Keil, 2002 UT 32,115, — Utah Adv. Rep —.
3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice that the Ogden

Rescue Mission holds church services daily?
Standard ofReview. A trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. Cf. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4)(a) (Supp. 1999) is relevant to a determination of this
case. That provision provides in relevant part as follows:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful
under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or
under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon
conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under Subsection 4(b)
if the act is committed:
* * *

2

(vi) in a church or synagogue;
* * *

(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in
Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); . . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine and drug paraphernalia. R. 57,
59.l The State alleged that defendant had a prior conviction for possession of a controlled
substance and that the current charge occurred within a drug-free zone, enhancing the
cocaine charge two degrees to a first degree felony. R. 55,57. The paraphernalia charge was
enhanced one degree based on the drug-free zone allegation. R. 59. Defendant waived his
right to a preliminary hearing and the matter was set for a jury trial. R. 24, 63.
Following a two-day trial, the jury found defendant guilty of both counts. R. 140-41,
203: 206-07. Because the prior conviction enhancement had been bifurcated from the other
issues, the State submitted to the trial judge, after the jury returned its verdict, a certified
copy of a judgment of conviction against defendant for possession of a controlled substance,
a second degree felony. R. 145-46; R. 203: 208-09. The trial court found that defendant was
"previously convicted of a drug-related offense in accordance with the enhancement on the

!

The original information charged defendant with possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute, see R. 1-2, but the amended information withdrew the
allegation that defendant had an intent to distribute, see R. 57. Defendant was also
originally charged with possession of a firearm by a restricted person, but that charge was
dismissed on the State's motion. R. 3, 58, 95.
3

information and enter[ed] a conviction based upon that finding and the finding of the jury of
a first degree felony, possession of a controlled substance." R. 203: 209.
Defendant moved to arrest judgment under rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove defendant possessed cocaine within 1,000
feet of a church. R. 155-59. The trial court denied the motion. R. 171, 178-80. After entry
of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, defendant objected to certain
findings. R. 186. On December 29, 2000, the court ordered the State to amend paragraph
two of the findings to reflect that the officer testified that the rescue mission "regularly holds
religious services" and further ordered that "the signature on the previous Findings and
Conclusions be vacated." SeeR. 188-89. That same day, the court entered the judgment of
conviction against defendant, sentencing him to an indeterminate prison term of five-yearsto-life for the cocaine conviction and a concurrent one-year term for the paraphernalia
conviction. R. 182-83. On January 16, 2001, the court entered Amended Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Order. R. 189-91. On February 12, 2001—45 days after
sentence was entered, defendant filed a notice of appeal. R. 196-97.
SUMMARY OF FACTS 2

On September 13, 1999, officers from the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force
executed a no-knock search warrant at a house believed to contain cocaine. R. 203: 68-69,
72,102-04. The house was 586 feet from the Ogden City Rescue Mission, a homeless shelter

2

The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v.
Loose, 2000 UT 11, f 2, 994 P.2d 1237.
4

which holds church services daily. R. 203: 117-19. Before officers entered the home, one
of two people on the porch of the house yelled, "Raid." R. 203: 105,136. Officers secured
the two on the porch and entered the house. Upon entering, officers handcuffed all occupants
found at the residence and assembled them in the living room. See R. 203: 74-77, 105, 12931,176. In all, officers secured at least eight men and women, including defendant, who was
found in the northeast bedroom with two adult females. R. 203: 105, 121, 174-75.
After securing the residence, officers began the search of the home for cocaine and
other drug-related evidence. R. 203: 77-78. While officers searched the premises, Officer
Troy Burnett interviewed defendant. R. 203: 176-77. Defendant told Officer Burnett that
he lived in the house, sharing the bedroom in which he was found with a woman named
Carolyn. R. 203: 177-78.3 Defendant explained that he had lived there for four months and
paid $150 per month in rent R. 203: 178. Defendant admitted that he was a crack cocaine
addict and smoked an ounce a day. R. 203: 179. He also admitted that he kept his personal
stash of cocaine in the bedroom, but refused to disclose its exact location. R. 203: 182.
In the search of defendant's bedroom, officers found a number of items evidencing
cocaine possession or use. On a wooden shelf, officers found a Sucrets package containing
3.01 grams of crack cocaine and a silver, metal container containing 1.85 grams of crack

3

Other items found in the bedroom also indicated that the room was defendant's
living quarters. For example, police found defendant's social security card on the
wooden shelf. R. 203: 92. They also found a bag containing defendant's driver's license
on the bed. R. 203: 95-97. Defendant admitted the bag belonged to him. R. 203:183.
5

cocaine. R. 203: 82, 84-86, 159-61,-166-67.4 Also found on the shelf was a 20-ounce pop
bottle which had been converted into a pipe for smoking drugs. R. 203: 82-83, 90-91. A
small plastic baggie containing 1.26 grams of powder cocaine was found near the bedroom
dresser. R. 203: 82, 86, 160-62, 167-68, And finally, police found on the dresser a red,
plastic container containing a Brillo pad—commonly used as a smoking filter for rock
cocaine; tweezers—commonly used to handle a heated piece of Brillo pad; and a 4-ounce
hanging scale—commonly used to weigh drug purchases. R. 203: 82, 86-89, 91-92.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Jurisdiction.

Because defendant filed his notice of appeal 45 days after

sentencing, this Court lacks jurisdiction. Defendant's motion to arrest judgment did not toll
the appeal period. Even if the motion to arrest judgment could be treated as a motion for a
new trial, it still did not toll the time for appeal because it was premature and therefore
untimely. In any event, defendant's appeal fails on the merits.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence that he was in possession of the cocaine and drug paraphernalia. He fails, however,
to marshal the evidence showing possession and use, ignoring evidence that the contraband
was seized from the bedroom where defendant was staying and defendant's admission that
he kept his stash of cocaine in that bedroom. That evidence was more than sufficient to
sustain the jury's verdict.

4

Although a discernible fingerprint on the Sucrets box was not that of defendant,
other indiscernible fingerprints were found on the box. R. 203: 126.
6

III. Evidence of a Nearby Church. Defendant also objects to the evidence that the
Ogden Rescue Mission is a church. However, because defendant has not adequately briefed
the issue, this Court should not address it. In any event, defendant's claim fails on its merits.
Defendant disputes the characterization of the mission as a church based on its
practice of holding church services daily. However, given the common understanding of a
church, the jury could reasonably find that the mission was a church based on the daily
practice of holding religious services. Defendant did not request an instruction giving the
jury any further guidance on the definition of a church and is therefore precluded from
suggesting a different definition now. Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in
taking judicial notice that the Ogden Rescue Mission was a church. The trial court, however,
did not take judicial notice that the mission was a church. Rather, it took judicial notice that
it held church services daily. Defendant offered nothing to suggest that this fact is not
generally known within the community.
Should this Court conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in taking judicial
notice, the appropriate remedy is not acquittal, but remand for a new trial on the sole issue
of whether the Ogden Rescue Mission is a church under the statute. The taking of judicial
notice is a question of admissibility, not sufficiency. When a trial court erroneously admits
evidence, the matter is remanded for a new trial.

Because the evidence supported

defendant's conviction for possession of cocaine with a prior conviction and possession of
drug paraphernalia, the appropriate remedy would be remand for a new trial on the drug-free
zone enhancement issue only. His convictions should otherwise be affirmed.
7

ARGUMENT
I.
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT'S APPEAL
After defendant filed his brief, the State moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. Because the Court deferred ruling on the matter, the State renews its claim that
the Court lacks jurisdiction.
Under rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the notice of appeal must be filed
"within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from." Utah R.
App. P. 4(a). The time period imposed for filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. See
State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36,37 (Utah 1982). An untimely notice of appeal will thus result
in dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Id. In a criminal case, the sentence itself is the final
judgment from which an appeal may be taken. State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah
1978). Accordingly, once sentence has been entered, the defendant has 30 days within which
to file a notice of appeal.
Here, sentence was pronounced on December 11, 2000, but not entered until
December 29,2000. R. 182-84 (Addendum A). As a result, defendant had until January 29,
2001 to file a notice of appeal.5 However, he did not file the notice of appeal until February
12, 2001, 45 days after sentencing. R. 196-97 (Addendum B). Thus, under rule 4,
defendant's appeal is untimely.

'Because the 30th day fell on Sunday, January 28, 2001, defendant had until
Monday, January 29, 2001 to file the notice. See Utah R. App. P. 22(a).
8

The appeal period is tolled if ^defendant timely files a motion for new trial under rule
24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Utah R. App. P. 4(b). When a rule 24 motion is
filed, "the time for appeal... shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial." Id.
However, the only substantive motion filed by defendant here was a motion to arrest
judgment under rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See R. 155-62 (Addendum C).
Defendant did not file a motion for a new trial. Accordingly, the 30-day appeal period was
not tolled.
Even if defendant's motion to arrest judgment could be construed as a motion for new
trial under rule 24, it still did not toll the appeal period because it was untimely. This Court
has held that "[a]n untimely motion for a new trial has no effect on the running of the time
for filing a notice of appeal." State v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320,1321 (Utah 1982). Under rule
24, a motion for new trial "shall be made within 10 days after imposition of sentence, or
within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day period." Utah R. App. P.
24(c) (emphasis added). Defendant's motion here was filed well before sentencing. See R.
155-62. As recognized by the court of appeals, a premature motion, like a delinquent motion,
is untimely under rule 24. State v. Vessey, 957 P.2d 1239, 1240 (Utah App. 1998); see also
State v. Gardner, 2001 UT 41,ffl[ 7-8, 23 P.3d 1043 (implicitly recognizing that a rule 24
motion filed before sentencing is untimely).6 As such, defendant's motion, even if construed

6

This Court currently has before it on certiorari review the precise issue of whether
a motion for new trial filed before imposition of sentence is timely. See State v. Putnik,
2001 UT App 182, cert granted, 32 P.3d 249.
9

as a rule 24 motion, "has no effect on the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal."
See Maiben, 652 P.2d at 1321.
Because the notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after entry of the sentence,
and because defendant did not file a motion that would otherwise toll the appeal period, this
Court lacks jurisdiction. Nevertheless, should this Court find that it has jurisdiction,
defendant's appeal fails on its merits for the reasons explained below.
II.
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S
CONVICTIONS FOR POSSESSION OF COCAINE AND DRUG
PARAPHERNALIA
On appeal, defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he
was in possession of the cocaine and paraphernalia seizedfromhis bedroom. Aplt. Brf. at
13-16.7 Defendant's claim lacks merit.
A,

APPELLATE REVIEW OF INSUFFICIENCY CLAIMS.

This Court's review of the evidence is limited. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 233
(Utah 1992). A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence thus bears a heavy
burden. See State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, at f 25, 989 P.2d 503. He must first
"'marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is
insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.'" State v. Hopkins, 1999

defendant has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence establishing that the
contraband seized was in fact cocaine and drug paraphernalia. See Aplt. Brf. at 13-17.
Nor has he challenged the evidence demonstrating that the house was within 1,000 feet of
the Ogden Rescue Mission or that he had previously been convicted of possessing a
controlled substance. See Aplt. Brf. at 13-18.
10

UT 98, f 14, 989 P.2d 1065 (quoting Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 799
(Utah 1991)). "[W]hen the appealing party does not meet its marshaling burden, [the Court]
;

assume[s] that the evidence adequately supported the finding[s],' and the complaining

party's assertion of insufficiency must therefore fail." Water & Energy Systems Tech., Inc.
v. Keil, 2002 UT 32, f 15, — Utah Adv. Rep — (quoting Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, ffl[
30,979 P.2d 338). Even when the marshaling requirement is met, the Court will not reverse
a conviction unless "the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that reasonable [minds]
could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Lamm, 606
P.2d 229,231 (Utah 1980); accord State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, J 19,999 P.2d 565 (quoting
Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425,433 (Utah 1998)).
B.

THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY FINDING THAT
DEFENDANT POSSESSED THE CONTRABAND.

Defendant fails in the first instance to marshal the evidence in support of the jury
finding that defendant possessed cocaine and drug paraphernalia.

Defendant only

acknowledges evidence that he and a female were in the bedroom of a house searched by
police officers pursuant to a search warrant. Aplt. Brf. at 15. He not only ignores all other
evidence, but incorrectly asserts that no testimony was given that the contraband was found
in the room occupied by him. See Aplt. Brf. at 15.
The evidence of possession, ignored by defendant on appeal, was overwhelming. That
evidence not only supported a finding that the contraband was seized from defendant's
bedroom, but that he in fact possessed it. To prove possession, the State must establish "that

11

there was a sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug to permit an inference that the
accused had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug/'
State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985). Nevertheless, "[possession need not be
exclusive, but may also be found where property is under the joint control and dominion of
defendant and others." State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217,1226-27 (Utah App.), cert denied, 860
P.2d 943 (Utah 1993); accord State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981) (holding that
unlawful possession does not require that the accused had sole and exclusive possession).
Here, the evidence was uncontroverted that police found defendant in the northeast
bedroom, identified as bedroom one or the first bedroom. Officers O'Malley and Burnett
both testified that defendant was found in bedroom one with two other adult females. See
R. 203: 73-74,105,121,174-75. Officer Hamblin's testimony was also uncontroverted that
he collected from that bedroom a Sucrets package containing cocaine, a small metal
container containing cocaine, a plastic baggie containing cocaine, and several items of drug
paraphernalia. R. 203: 79-92.
Defendant contends that because Officer Hamblin did notfindthe contraband himself,
but collected it from other officers who notified him of the find, the evidence was insufficient
to show that it was found in the first bedroom. See Aplt. Brf. at 15-16. Defendant, however,
ignores testimony establishing that police applied a procedure wherein evidence is gathered
from the location where it is found. Officer Hamblin explained that his role in the search was
that of the "finder." See R. 203: 77-78. Officers assigned as "searchers" conducted the
actual search of the home, and upon discovering evidence, yelled, "finder." R. 203: 78, 98.
12

Officer Hamblin explained that when he heard an officer yell "finder," he responded to that
location and collected the evidence. R. 203: 78. After collecting the evidence from a
searcher, Officer Hamblin delivered it to Officer Shawn O'Malley, who bagged and
inventoried the evidence on a table in the kitchen. R. 203: 106-08. Officers Hamblin and
O'Malley both explained that the finder collected the evidence from the searchers as that
evidence was found and in the location it was found. R. 203: 77-78, 98; see also R. 203:
131-36.
Although neither Officer Hamblin nor Officer O'Malley personally observed each
find, Officer O'Malley testified that he heard officers yelling, "finder," and received
evidence from Officer Hamblin thereafter. R. 203: 133. Based on the foregoing testimony,
the jury could reasonably infer that police in this instance followed the applicable procedure.
In the words of Officer O'Malley, he believed that there was a "guarantee" that the practice
was followed that evening, explaining that those involved in the search were officers and
there was no need for them to deviate from the procedure. R. 203: 135-36. Indeed,
defendant was one of eight people at the house and he was not even identified in the search
warrant affidavit, which alleged that others there were distributing controlled substances.
See R. 203: 120-21. In other words, there was no motive to frame defendant as he appears
to suggest in his brief.
Defendant's most glaring omission, however, was Officer Troy Burnett's testimony.
Officer Burnett testified that he interviewed defendant while other officers searched the
home. R. 203: 175-76. In that interview, defendant admitted that he paid rent to stay in the
13

northeast bedroom, that he was a crack cocaine addict, and that "he had his personal stash
of crack in that room." R. 203: 177'-79, 182 (emphasis added). These facts, ignored by
defendant, strongly support the inference that defendant had both the power and the intent
to exercise dominion and control over the [contraband]." See Fox, 709 P.2d at 319.
* * *

Because defendant failed to marshal the evidence of possession, and because that
evidence supports the jury finding of possession, defendant's claim of insufficiency
regarding the evidence of possession should be rejected.
III.
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ADDRESS DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE TO
EVIDENCE THAT THE OGDEN RESCUE MISSION HOLDS CHURCH
SERVICES DAILY BECAUSE HE DID NOT ADEQUATELY BRIEF IT; IN
ANY EVENT, HIS CHALLENGE FAILS ON THE MERITS
Defendant also challenges the evidence that the Ogden Rescue Mission and the St.
Anne's homeless shelter were churches. See Aplt. Brf. at 16-17. The nature of defendant's
challenge is far from clear, but appears to be two-fold. First, defendant appears to challenge
the characterization of a homeless shelter as a church. See Aplt. Brf. at 16-17. Second,
defendant appears to challenge the admissibility of the testimony that the Ogden Rescue
Mission held religious services daily. See Aplt. Brf. at 17.
A.

DEFENDANT DID NOT ADEQUATELY BRIEF THE ISSUE.

This Court has long held that it "is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with
pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may
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dump the burden of argument and research." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d439,450 (Utah 1988)
(quoting Willamsonv. 0/?sa/*/,416N.E.2d783,784(Ill. App. 1981)). Indeed,rule24(a)(9),
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires that the argument "contain the contentions and
reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, . . . with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Thus, "rule 24(a)(9) requires not just
bald citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on
that authority." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998).
As noted, defendant's objection to the evidence regarding a church is not well defined.
Citing to the statute, he observes that "church" is not defined in the statute and points out that
the Court "'beginfs] by examining the statute's plain language and resortfs] to other methods
of statutory interpretation only if the language of the statute is ambiguous.'" Aplt. Brf. at 16
(quoting O'Keefe v. Utah State Retirement Bd, 929 P.2d 1112, 1115 (Utah App. 1996)).
Defendant then complains that "[w]ithout further evidence the Jury had no basis to find that
these entities fit the definition of a church." Aplt. Brf. at 17. However, defendant does not
offer a definition of church and he does not explain or cite to any authority indicating what
additional facts must be present to establish that an institution is a church.
Defendant also asserts that Officer O'Malley's testimony regarding the holding of
church services was inadmissible hearsay and that no basis existed for the trial court to take
judicial notice thereof. See Aplt. Brf. at 17-18. Again, defendant cites to no authority in
support of his claim. He does not cite, much less discuss, rule 201, Utah Rules of Evidence,
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governing judicial notice, or rules £01 through 806, Utah Rules of Evidence, governing
hearsay. See Aplt. Brf. at 16-18. Nor does he cite to any case authority supporting his claim.
"A brief must contain some support for each contention." State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d
960,966 (Utah 1989). Yet, defendant has provided none. Because defendant's brief "wholly
lacks legal analysis" and fails to cite any authority supporting his claim, this Court should
decline to address it on appeal. Id.
B.

DEFENDANT'S CLAIM FAILS ON THE MERITS.

Even if this Court were to reach the merits, defendant's claim still fails.
1.

Holding Daily Church Services Is Sufficient to Establish the Ogden
Rescue Mission's Character as a Church.

Defendantfirstobjects to afindingthat the Ogden Rescue Mission is a church based
on the fact it holds religious services daily. See Aplt. Brf. at 16-17. As defendant observes
in his brief, "church" is not defined under the statute. Aplt. Brf. at 16. This Court has held
that "in the absence of evidence of intent to the contrary, the words of a statute or ordinance
are given their common meaning." Salt Lake City v. Roberts, 2002 UT 30, f 27, — Utah
Adv. Rep — (citing Ambassador Athletic Club v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 27 Utah 2d 377,
378, 496 P.2d 883, 883 (Utah 1972)). Accordingly, where the legislature did not define
"church" in the Utah Controlled Substances Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-1 to -21 (Supp.
1999), this Court will "assume[ ] it was intended to have a meaning generally understood and
accepted by the public." Ambassador Athletic Club, 27 Utah 2d at 379, 496 P.2d at 883
(referring to the word "hotel" under Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-4(0).
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The definition of a word in a standard nonlegal dictionary is "a helpful guide to [a
word's] general meaning." See Mesa Development Co. v. Sandy City Corp., 948 P.2d 366,
369 (Utah App. 1997); see also Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 979
(Utah 1993) (taking definition of "toxic" from the dictionary). The dictionary defines a
church as "a building set apart for public esp. Christian worship" or as "a place of worship
of any religion." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 404 (1993). The dictionary also
defines "church" as "church service: divine worship or religious service in a church: the
church building with the service going on in it." Id. Thus, a "church" is commonly
understood as a place where religious services are held.8 Here, Officer O'Malley testified
that church services are held daily at the Ogden Rescue Mission and the trial court apparently
took judicial notice of that fact. R. 203: 117-20. This evidence thus supported a jury finding
that the Ogden Rescue Mission qualifies as a church.

8

The Alcoholic Beverage Control Act defines a church as a building that is:
(a) set apart primarily for the purpose of worship;
(b) in which religious services are held;
(c) with which clergy is associated;
(d) the main body of which is kept for that use and not put to any other
use inconsistent with its primary purpose; and
(e) which is tax exempt under the laws of this state.
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-1-105(9) (2001). Although defendant argued in his motion to
arrest judgment that this definition should also apply here, see R. 158, he makes no such
argument on appeal. Doing so, however, would have been futile because defendant did
not request an instruction so defining the word and he therefore waived any claim that he
was entitled to a more precise definition. "[I]f such an instruction had been desired,
counsel should have presented a written request therefor wherein he tendered to the court
an appropriately worded definition as he is required to do." State v. Day, 572 P.2d 703,
705 (Utah 1977); accord State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 269 (Utah 1998).
17

The fact that the Ogden Rescue Mission operated as a homeless shelter does not
invalidate its character as a church. Indeed, as recognized by a New Jersey court, "'the range
of religious conduct is wide, and the structures which house it are various.'" St. John 's
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City ofHoboken, 479 A.2d 935, 937 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1983) (quoting Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. Kingery, 20 N.E.2d 583 (111. 1939)).9
Providing shelter for the homeless is one such traditional function of churches. Id. As
observed in St. John's9 "[t]he use of religious places as sanctuaries predates even the
Christian Church." Id. In other words, the fact that the Ogden Rescue Mission provided
shelter for the homeless in no way detracts from its character as a church, but is entirely
consistent with "the centuries old church tradition of sanctuary for those in need of shelter
and aid." Id. at 938.
Because the holding of religious services is consistent with the function of a church,
as is providing shelter to the needy, the Ogden Rescue Mission qualified as a church as that
word is commonly understood.
2.

The Trial Court Took Judicial Notice That the Ogden Rescue
Mission Holds Church Services Daily, Not That it Was a Church.

Defendant also contends that the trial court "erred in taking judicial notice that the
Ogden Rescue Mission and St. Anne's were both a church within the meaning of the statute/'

9

The issue before the Court in St. John 5 was whether or not the church's operation
of a homeless shelter violated the zoning laws. See St. Johns, 479 A.2d at 936-37.
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Aplt. Brf. at 18.10 Defendant, however, misconstrues the fact to which the court took judicial
notice.
On direct examination, Officer O'Malley testified that he knew church services were
held daily at the Ogden Rescue Mission. R. 203: 118. On cross-examination, Officer
O'Malley explained that he knew this because he spoke with the supervisor at the mission.
R. 203: 119. Defense counsel immediately moved to strike Officer O'Malley's testimony,
arguing that it was "based on hearsay, lack of personal knowledge." R. 203: 119. After
defense counsel further explained his objection, the following exchange ensued:
The Court:

I suppose this is part of his investigation?

[Prosecutor]:

Well, Judge, I think it is. Plus I think it's common
understanding that the Court could even take judicial
notice that they have church services there every day.

The Court:

I could do that.

[Defense]:

Well, your Honor, I'm objecting, it's not part of—

The Court:

Overruled, You may proceed.

R. 203: 120.11 The trial court, therefore, did not take judicial notice that either the Ogden
Rescue Mission or St. Anne's were churches. It simply took judicial notice of the fact that

10

Although the State introduced evidence that the St. Anne's homeless shelter was
within 1,000 feet of the home, see R. 203: 118-19, the State does not allege on appeal that
it was a church. Apartfromthe name itself, no evidence was introduced to establish its
character as a church. The name "St. Anne's," although highly suggestive of church
affiliation, is not sufficient by itself to demonstrate that the building is a church.
n

On one page, defendant claims that the trial court did not take judicial notice and
on the next page he claims the court erred in taking judicial notice. See Aplt. Brf. at 1718. A fair reading of the exchange suggests that the trial court did in fact take judicial
notice that the mission held daily church services.
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the Ogden Rescue Mission holds daity church services. As explained above, whether or not
the practice of holding daily church services qualified the building as a church under the
statute was a factual issue for the jury.
Defendant has not disputed the fact that it is generally known within the community
that the Ogden Rescue Mission holds church services before meals. Rule 201, Utah Rules
of Evidence, permits a trial court to take judicial notice of any fact that is "not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction
of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Utah R. Evid. 201(b). Although this
Court may not know whether the mission holds church services daily, the court in that district
apparently does. Defendant offered nothing to the contrary at trial, nor does he now.
C.

DEFENDANT IS IN ANY EVENT ENTITLED TO NO MORE THAN A REMAND ON THE
ISSUE OF WHETHER THE HOUSE WAS WITHIN 1,000 FEET OF A CHURCH.

The State concedes that should this Court find that the trial court erred in taking
judicial notice of the daily church services or in otherwise admitting Officer O'Malley's
testimony to that effect, that error would be prejudicial. It was the only evidence that
defendant's house was within 1,000 feet of a church, which enhances defendant's offense
to a first degree felony. In that event, the matter should be remanded for trial on that sole
issue.
Defendant characterizes his objection as an insufficiency claim, requiring acquittal
of the first degree felony offense. See Aplt. Brf. at 17. As explained above, however, the
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issue is not whether the evidence was insufficient to sustain a finding that the house was
within 1,000 feet of a church, but whether the evidence was properly admitted in the first
instance. When a trial court erroneously admits evidence that is prejudicial to defendant, the
appropriate remedy is not acquittal, but a new trial. See State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484,486
(Utah 1997) (remanding for new trial after concluding that trial court erred in admitting
evidence of prior crimes).
Moreover, because the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict in all other
respects, see infra, at 10-13, including the fact that defendant had previously been convicted
of felony drug possession, defendant would be entitled to a new trial only on the drug-free
zone enhancement issue. See State v. Lopes, 2001 UT 85, ^ 20,34 P.3d 762 (remanding for
new trial on gang enhancement issue only). While a conviction on that issue would preserve
defendant's first degree felony and class A misdemeanor convictions, an acquittal would still
leave him with a second degree felony conviction for cocaine possession and a class B
misdemeanor conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to dismiss the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Alternatively, the State requests the Court to affirm
defendant's convictions.
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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT
NOTICE

vs.

Case No: 991903705 FS

KEVIN KIMBROUGH BOWERS,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

STANTON M. TAYLOR
December II, 20C0

PRESENT
Clerk:
marykd
Prosecutor: CAMILLE L. NEIDER
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MARTIN V GRAVIS
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: June 21, 1966
Video
Tape Number:
T1211
Tape Count: 219
CHARGES
1. POSS/DIST C/S W/IN 1000 • OF SCHL/PBLIC P - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/16/2000 Guilty
3. USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/16/2000 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS/DIST C/S W/IN 1000' :=
SCHL/PBLIC P a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced co a:
indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be
life in the Utah State Prison.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

Page 1

^ 18^

Case No: 991903705
Dec 11, 2000

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The prison sentence imposed in this case may run concurrently ::
the prison sentence imposed in case no. 001902314.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
The Court recommends credit for cime served.

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG
PARAPHERNALIA a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced :o
a term of 365 day(s)
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
The jail sentence imposed in this case is to be served at the 7iar.
Scate Prison and run concurrently to the prison sentence imposed :r.
this case and in case no. 001902314.
The Court sets an hearing on 12/22/00 at 2:00 p.m. on the
objections to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed by
defense attorney, Martin Gravis.
OBJECTION HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 12/22/2000
Time: 02:00 p.m.
Location: 2nd Floor Southwest
SECOND DISTRICT COURT
2 525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Before Judge: STANTON M. TAYLOR
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In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individual:
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Stella Perea
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proceeding. The general information phone number is (301)395-10?:
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY

^

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

PlaintiftfAppellee,

vs.
KEVIN K. BOWERS,
Defendant/Appellant,

Case No. 991903705
Judge Stanton M. Taylor

TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT A N D THE ATTORNEY GENERAL:
NOTICE IS HEREBY given that Kevin K. Bowers, Defendant, hereby appeals
from the order of the Court dated December 26, 2000, sentencing the Defendant to serve
a term of 5 years to life and 365 days on a second count in the Utah State Prison, time on
each count to run concurrent with one another and with a prior prison term on his
conviction o f one count of possession of a controlled substance, a 1st Degree Felony; and
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to one count; of violation of the drug paraphernalia act a Class A Misdemeanor
DATED this 8th day of February, 2001.
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\JMCi RICHARDS
MAURICE
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Notice of
Appeal was posted in the United States mail on the 9th day of February, 2001, and
addressed to:
Utah Court of Appeals
P.O. Box 140241
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230
Attorney General's Office
ATTN: Criminal Appeals
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Weber County Attorney
2380 Washington Boulevard, 2nd Floor
Ogden, UT 84401
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MARHNV. GRAVIS (#1237)
PUBUC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, INC.,
OF WEBER COUNTY

Attorneys for Defendant
2568 Washington Blvd., Suite 203
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 392-8247
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY,
STATE OF

UtAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,

AUG 0 i CCH

MOTION TO ARREST JUDGEMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
KEVIN K. BOWERS,

Defendant.
COMES NOW

CASE No.

I

991903705

JUDGE STANTON M. TAYLOR

Defendant Kevin K. Bowers, by and through his Attorney Martin V. Gravis

and hereby moves this Court to arrest the Judgement in the above entitled matter pursuant to
Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Said Motion is based upon the ground that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

The pertinent facts of this case are the Defendant was convicted of Possession of a
Controlled Substance within a thousand feet of a church and further enhanced because of
a prior conviction of possession of a controlled substance a 1st Degree Felony and
possession of Paraphernalia within a thousand feet of a church a Class A Misdemeanor.

1

STATE OF UTAH VS. KEVIN K. BOWERS

CASE #991903705
MOTION TO ARREST JUDGEMENT

possession of Paraphernalia within a thousand feet of a church a Class A Misdemeanor.
2.

That the issue as to the prior conviction was bifurcated from the trial and was submitted
to the court for decision but the jury determined the issue of whether or not the defendant
was guilty of possession of a controlled substance within a thousand feet of a church.

3.

That the jury was instructed as to the elements of the offense of possession of a
controlled substance and Possession of Paraphernalia within a thousand feet of a church.
(Copies of the pertinent jury instructions are attached and by this reference made a
complete part hereof.)

4.

That the State did not request jury instruction of the lesser included offense of Possession
of Cocaine a 2nd Degree felony and possession of Drug parapher a Class "B"
Misdemeanor.

5.

That officer Shawn O'Malley testified that the offense occurred within both a thousand
feet of Ogden Recuse Mission and St Anne's and further on direct examination that he
knew that religious services were held daily at the Ogden Recuse Mission after the
defense had raised an objection on lack of personal knowledge.

6.

That on cross examination officer O'Malley testified that the way he knew religious
services were held at the Ogden Recuse Mission was that a supervisor at the Ogden
Recuse Mission had told him that.

7.

That defense promptly made a motion to strike all of his testimony concerning religious
services at the Ogden Rescue Mission on the bases on the lack of personal knowledge.
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But the court denied Defendant's Motion.
8.

That on direct examination Officer O'Malley testified that the Ogden Recuse Mission
was a homeless shelter and offered no testimony about what St. Anne's is But, on cross
examination admitted that St. Anne's is also a homeless shelter. In fact at no time was
any evidence introduced that St. Anne's was anything but a homeless shelter.

ARGUMENT
The State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction of the
defendant because they failed to prove the element of the offense that the possession of the
controlled substance occurred within a thousand feet of a church.
The evidence presented by officer O'Malley should have been stricken on the grounds of
lack of personal knowledge that religious services were held daily at the Ogden Rescue Mission
since the officer was relying on an inadmissible heresay statement. Rule 602 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence states as follows:
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a
finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal
knowledge may, but need not, consist of the witness' own testimony. This rule is subject to
provision of Rule 703, relation to opinion testimony by expert witnesses.
Rule 703 is inapplicable in this case since Officer O'Malley was not qualified as an
expert witness nor was notice given pursuant Code Ann. 77-17-13. Furthermore the Statement
from the supervisor at the Ogden Recuse Mission would inadmissable as heresay under Rule 803
(24) since the State could not show they made reasonable efforts to bring the evidence in from
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another source nor did they give notice to the defense.
The State also argued the Court could take Judicial notice that the Ogden Recuse Mission
was a church but the court did not take judicial notice as is evidence by the fact the court did not
instruct the jury as required by Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 201 (g).
Title 58-37-8 does not define what a church is for purposes of the enhancement but a
church is defined under 32-a-105(9), the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act as follows:
(9) "Church" means a building:
(a) set apart primarily for the purpose of worship;
(b) in which religious services are held;
(c) with which clergy is associated;
(d) the main body of which is kept for the use and not put to any other use
inconsistent with its primary purpose; and
(e) which is tax exempt under the laws of this state.
In applying this definition to the facts of this case it is clear that the Ogden Recuse
Mission is not a church since it's not set apart primarily for the purpose of worship, and the only
evidence that religious services are held there is the questioned testimony of officer O'Malley,
there is no evidence that the clergy is associated with the Ogden Recuse Mission, that the main
body is kept and used for purpose inconsistent with religious purposes since it's a homeless
shelter and there is no evidence that the Ogden Recuse Mission is tax except under the Law of
the State of Utah. Therefore the State has failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that the
offense occurred within a thousand feet of a church.
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CONCLUSION

The Judgement and Conviction of the Defendant should be arrested and a not guilty
verdict should be entered in the above entitled matter since the State failed to present sufficient
evidence upon which a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense occurred
within a thousand feet of a church. Furthermore the State should not be entitled to a conviction
as to the less included offense of possession of cocaine enhanced to a 2nd degree felony based
upon a prior conviction since the State did not request the jury instruction as to the lesser
included offense and the jury therefore only had the option of finding the defendant guilty or not
guilty of the offense of Possession of a controlled substance within a thousand feet of a church a
1st degree felony. Since the jury could not have found the lesser included offense and if the
evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction of possession within a thousand feet of a church
and the State did not request the jury consider the lesser included offense the only verdict the
jury could have arrived at was not guilty.
nu
DATED this ^ i day of August 2000.
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MARTIN V. GRAVIS
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
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CERTIFICATE OF HA^P PEUVERY
I certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to arrest

Judgement to: ~/L

j/tfyfS?*******-'

Camille Neider
Deputy Weber County Attorney
2380 Washington Blvd., 2nd Floor
Ogden, Utah 84401
Secretary
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